The strategic behavior of receivers (players) in a multiple-input multiple-output Gaussian broadcast channel is investigated using the framework of non-cooperative game theory. In contrast to the non-cooperative Gaussian multiple access channel game in which each player's feasible set of actions is independent of the actions of other players, the action space of receivers in the Gaussian broadcast channel is mutually coupled, usually by a sum power or joint covariance constraint, and hence cannot be treated using traditional Nash equilibrium solution concepts. To characterize the strategic behavior of receivers in a broadcast channel game, this paper treats the broadcast channel power allocation (or covariance matrix selection) as a generalized Nash equilibrium problem with common constraints. The concept of normalized equilibrium (NoE) is used to characterize the equilibria and the existence and uniqueness of NoEs are proven for key scenarios.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperation between wireless nodes has emerged as a key paradigm that can yield tremendous performance gains in a wireless network. Most networks are based on the assumption that nodes voluntarily cooperate with each other. The emergence of heterogenous networks in which nodes are controlled by different entities violates this assumption of voluntary cooperation. The goal of our work is to develop game theoretic models for a large wireless network to understand how nodes interact and cooperate and how the benefits of cooperation can be shared between various nodes. To achieve this goal, we would first like to understand how several nodes in interact in elementary networks such as multiple access channels, broadcast channels etc, which form the building blocks of larger networks.
To this end, we first studied the problem of transmitter cooperation and utility sharing in a Gaussian multiple access channel in [1] . In this paper, we introduce a game-theoretic model for the Gaussian broadcast channel (GBC) to model strategic non-cooperative behavior among receivers using the concept of normalized equilibria. Such a model allows us to determine whether points on the Pareto boundary are equilibria, mechanism to enforce such equilibria in a scenario with coupled constraints across players and pave the way to study receiver cooperation in a broadcast setting.
In a typical game, the actions of each player are independent of other players. Several scenarios such as the Gaussian multi-This research has been funded in part by the following grants and organizations: NSF CCF-0917343, NSF IIS 0917410, CAREER CNS-0954116, ONR N00014-09-1-0700, NSF CNS 0832186, NSF CCF-1117896 and NSF CNS-082175 ple access channel (MAC), the Gaussian interference channel etc have been extensively studied under this framework (see [1] - [6] and the references therein for a detailed survey). However, in scenarios such as the GBC, the choice of actions of one player may restrict the set of feasible choices for every other player [7] , [8] (see [9] for a discussion on parallel Gaussian interference channels for an example scenario). Interaction of players at the level of feasible sets makes the problem much harder than standard non-cooperative games. The problem of determining the equilibrium points of games with coupled constraints is called the generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) [2] , [7] , [9] and the points themselves are called generalized Nash equilibria (GNE). From a game theoretic perspective, the broadcast channel has received very little attention as compared to other channels such as the MAC. A discrete memoryless broadcast channel with two users and a resource manager was considered and impact of the information available to the resource manager in modifying utility of each user was studied in [10] .
The main contributions of this paper are as follows: (1) We model the interaction between receivers getting data over a GBC, with the transmitter employing dirty paper coding or linear precoding, as a GNEP. The transmitter computes the precoding matrix for the message intended for each receiver and the precoding matrices are coupled by a common joint constraint. (2) We first show that there exists at least one GNE for the broadcast channel. In fact, it is well know that under mild conditions there may exist infinitely many GNEs for a given GNEP [7] , [8] . Games in which each player has the same coupled constraints, such as in the broadcast channel game, belong to a special class whose GNEs can be characterized with weight vectors. The GNEs of this special class, first defined by Rosen [7] , are called normalized equilibrium (NoE) points. (3) Using Rosen's methodology, we show that for every feasible weight vector there exists at least one NoE. We first derive a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of the NoE [6] , [7] and for the special case of the aligned and degraded broadcast channel determine the set of weight vectors for which the NoE is unique. The uniqueness of the weight vector enables the implementation of equilibria using distributed mechanisms [11] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly introduces the model for the broadcast channel and presents several game theoretic definitions and preliminaries useful for the rest of the paper. Section III discuss the existence and uniqueness of NoEs and Section IV concludes this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we describe the signal model and state several game theoretic concepts used throughout this paper.
A. Signal Model
Consider a general multiuser multi-input multi-output (MIMO) broadcast channel with one transmitter and K receivers. Let us denote the transmitted signal by x, a vector of length t, where is the number of transmit (TX) antennas. The TX signal is the sum of independent signals x k , each drawn from a Gaussian codebook and intended for the kth receiver (RX).
The covariance matrix Q k 0 captures the signaling direction for the kth user. The signal x is transmitted over a GBC and the signal at the kth receiver can be expressed as
where H k is the r k × t channel gain matrix from the TX to the kth RX and r i is the number of antennas at the i th RX. Without loss of generality, we assume that the TX signaling is constrained by a covariance matrix S 0 [12] .
The scenario with a sum power constraint, i.e., can be similarly modeled as
where P tot is the maximum transmit sum power for all the antennas. For simplicity of illustration, we only consider the covariance matrix constraint in this paper; all the results derived are also valid for sum power constraint as well. We now define a class of broadcast channels which are simplified versions of the general GBC [12] . 1) AMBC: A MIMO BC is called aligned if the number of transmit antennas is equal to the number of antennas at each of the receivers (t = r 1 = r 2 = . . . = r K ) and the channel gain matrices are all identity matrices (H i = I t×t ).
2) ADBC: A MIMO BC is called aligned and degraded if the BC is aligned and the covariances of the Gaussian noise at the receiver are ordered such that
B. Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems 1) Definition: Formally, a GNEP consists of K players with each player controlling the variables Q k (Q k are positive semi-definite covariance matrices in our problem). Each player has an objective function, v k , which depends on Q k as well as the controlling variables of all other players denoted by Q −k . We denote the utility function by v k (Q k , Q −k ) or v k (Q), Q = (Q 1 , Q 2 , ..., Q K ) to emphasize the dependence on the controlling variables and will be called the utility function of the kth player for the rest of this paper. Given the actions Q −k picked by all other players, the set of feasible actions available to the kth player are determined by the joint constraints of the problem and are denoted by A k (Q −k ), the feasible set or action space of the kth player. We emphasize that the set A k (Q −k ) is a function of the actions of the other players. Each player, given the strategies of all other players, picks a strategy that solves the maximization problem
Let B k (Q −k ) denote the set of all the solutions for this maximization problem. The GNEP is the problem of finding
Define
. In other words, the GNEP is to find a fixed point Q * such that Q * ∈ B(Q * ) and Q * solves the maximization in (5) for the players. Such a point is called a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) or a solution to the GNEP. A point Q * = (Q * 1 , ..., Q * K ) is therefore an equilibrium if no player can increase his objective function by unilaterally changing Q k to any other feasible point.
2) Normalized Equilubrium: A GNEP usually has multiple or even infinitely many solutions [7] . A special class of GNEPs, called GNEP with shared common constraints was considered in Rosen [7] . This class is characterized by the fact that the constraints involving multiple players are common to all the players. Rosen proposed a solution concept called the normalized equilibrium (NoE) to characterize such GNEPs. In these games, the regulator (the TX here) seeks a solution that can be adopted by competitive players (here RXs) such that the common constraints, which are dependent on the control variables of each player, are fulfilled (see [11] for a detailed discussion). An NoE is defined in terms of a specific constant r k , which determines the dual variables for the kth player. The NoE is a GNE for which the Lagrange multipliers (shadow prices) associated with the shared constraints are equal among all players up to constant factors, and its uniqueness is guaranteed under appropriate conditions [7] .
GNEs are not directly self-enforceable like a Nash equilibrium as it is not feasible to assume that each player picks his strategy independently and the selected strategies satisfy the coupled constraints. However, NoEs of a GNEP have significant explanatory power. For example, we would like to know which points on the Pareto boundary are also NoEs and what values of r i (weights for each player [7] , [11] ) must be adopted to implement a particular equilibrium. Analysis of NoEs can help the regulator (TX here) in implementing the equilibrium solution in a distributed fashion [11] . Let us denote by F the set of jointly feasible strategies of the players, and by F k the projection of F on the space from which the control variables for the kth player come from. Then F ⊆ F 1 ×F 2 ...×F K , with equality satisfied when the control variables do not have any joint constraints. Let us define the function
C. Concave games, existence and uniqueness of NoEs
for a fixed vector r = (r 1 , r 2 , ..., r K ) ∈ R K . The K-tuple Q * = (Q * 1 , ..., Q * K ) is an NoE if Q * satisfies the equivalent fixed point condition
where the maximization is carried out over the convex set F. For concave games, the existence of NoEs is guaranteed by Theorem 3 in [7] for all vectors r in the positive orthant. Note that for any given value of r, there could be multiple NoEs. We now state a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of NoEs.
, r i > 0 be a weighted sum of the utilities of each player, where Q are the control variables for all the players and r a vector containing a set of weights.
. . .
where ∇ i is the derivative w.r.t the i th players'control variables is called the pseudo-gradient of σ(Q, r).
Definition 3. Vector valued strategies [7] : The function σ(x, r) is called diagonally strictly concave (DSC) in vector valued strategies for x ∈ F and a fixed r ∈ R K if for every x 0 , x 1 ∈ F, we have
The DSC condition represents the fact that the utility function a user is more sensitive to his control variable than the control variables of all other players. From Theorem 4 in [7] , we know that for vector valued strategies, if σ(x, r) is DSC for every r ∈ R, where R is a convex subset of the positive orthant, then for each r ∈ R the NoE is unique. Definition 4. Matrix valued strategies [6] : The function σ(Q, r) is called DSC in matrix valued strategies for Q ∈ F and a fixed r ∈ R K if for every Q 0 , Q 1 ∈ F, we have
We show that if for matrix valued strategies, the DSC condition is satisfied for every r ∈ R, then the NoE is unique for that r ∈ R.
III. THE BROADCAST CHANNEL AS A GENERALIZED NASH EQUILIBRIUM PROBLEM A. Model of the game
As mentioned previously, the broadcast channel has a single TX sending data to several RXs over the wireless channel, which are players in the game. We assume Gaussian codebooks are used for communication and each RX's control variable is the covariance matrix Q i 0 of the signal x i intended for that receiver RX i . All these players are constrained by a joint covariance constraint given by
Thus, it is clear that the dependent constraints are common to each player and hence this game belongs to the class of GNEPs which can be characterized by NoEs.
We consider both linear precoding [13] and dirty paper coding (DPC) [12] based encoding schemes at the TX. For the DPC, we also assume a fixed encoding order at the TX without time-sharing between orders. Each player obtains a rate (the game utility) based on the choice of actions of all other players and the TX. For a general GBC, if the data streams are linearly precoded at the TX with covariance matrices Q i , the utility function (rate achievable) of the k th player can be written as [13] :
Similarly, if the data streams are coded using DPC with encoding order (K, K − 1, ..., 1), then the utility function of the kth player can be written as [12] :
It is easy to see that the utilities of the kth player, v k (Q k , Q −k ) in (12) and (13), are concave in Q k and continuous in the control variables of all the other players.
B. Existence of NoEs
Proposition 1. The broadcast channel game with linear precoding or DPC is a concave game and hence for each weight vector in the positive orthant, r = (r 1 , r 2 , ..., r K ), r k > 0, there exists at least one NoE.
Proof: Each player's control variable in the broadcast channel game is the signaling covariance matrix Q i . By definition Q i 0. In addition, the sum power constraint or the joint covariance constraint ensure that the set of jointly feasible strategies is compact and convex. The kth player's utility is concave in Q k and is continuous in Q −k and hence the broadcast channel game is a concave game. From Theorem 3 of [7] , we know that a concave game has at least one NoE for every positive weight vector r.
C. Uniqueness of NoEs
We now derive the condition for the uniqueness of the equilibrium points. We start by assuming that for a given r there exist multiple equilibrium points and then arrive at a contradiction which proves the uniqueness. Theorem 1. The sufficient condition for the uniqueness of the normalized Nash equilibrium for a given weight vector r is given as
Proof: LetQ = Q 1 ,Q 2 , ...,Q K andQ = Q 1 ,Q 2 , ...,Q K be two K-tuples of covariance matrices which are normalized equilibria to the game characterized by the weight vector r. We know from (8) that f (Q,Q, r) = max P ∈F f (P,Q, r) and f (Q,Q, r) = max P ∈F f (P,Q, r).
Writing the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions [14] for the two equilibria yields:
Now multiplying (f) and (g) with (Q i −Q i ) and (Q i −Q i ) respectively, summing on i and taking the trace we get
Re-arranging and evaluating the second term,
We have shown that β ≥ 0 and hence for α + β = 0 we need that α ≤ 0. Now
This condition is exactly the DSC condition defined in Section II. If for the broadcast channel game, we have that α > 0 for some r then we have arrived at a contradiction and hence there cannot exist multiple NoE for that r. For all such r, α > 0 is a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of the NoE. Note that we have derived the sufficient condition for uniqueness of the NoE for the broadcast channel game with joint covariance constraints. We state without proof that the DSC condition with matrix valued strategies holds for a more general scenarios (for example, sum power or per-antenna power constraint or other common constraints) and is not restricted to the broadcast channel problem (see [7] for a discussion on how the DSC condition with vector valued strategies holds for concave games in general).
We now consider special cases for the broadcast channel and determine which values of r result in unique NoEs. We first state two trace inequalities that will be used to derive the uniqueness results. Lemma 1. [15] For any positive integer K and a set of positive semi-definite matrices A 1 , A 2 , ..., A K and B 1 , B 2 , ..., B K such that A 1 0 and B 1 0, we have that
Note that the set of inequalities may not be the tightest trace inequalities. For example, for K = 2 and any positive real number w, it has been shown in [16] that
Clearly, there is much room for deriving generalizations of such inequalities and such generalizations will improve the characterization of the unique NoEs. We restrict our attention to the above known inequalities in this paper.
D. Uniqueness of NoEs for the broadcast channel
Theorem 2. For the ADBC with dirty paper coding at the TX and interference canceling receivers, a unique normalized equilibrium point exists for r 1 ≥ r 2 ≥ ... ≥ r K > 0.
Proof: For the ADBC, the utility obtained by the kth receiver is given by [12] v
For this utility function we now show that α > 0 and thus determine the unique NoEs. Let (Q 1 ,Q 2 , ...,Q k ) and (Q 1 ,Q 2 , ...,Q k ) be any two tuples of covariance matrices which satisfy the covariance constraint:
S. Substituting the utility obtained when using the two sets of covariances in the DSC condition, we get
where the term T n can be expressed as
(23) It is now sufficient to show that T n > 0. Notice that the structure of T n closely resembles the inequality in (18). Choose the quantities
By definition, since N 1 is a positive definite matrix andQ 1 ,Q 1 are positive semi-definite the matrices A 1 and B 1 are strictly positive definite. From the degradedness of the channel, we get that N i −N i−1 is a positive semi-definite matrix and hence A i and B i are positive semi-definite for i = 2, ..., K. Substituting the values of A i and B i in Eq. 18, it is straight forward to see that T n ≥ 0. For an ADBC channel having identity channel matrices, we know from [6] that if the NoEsQ =Q then T n > 0 and hence the normalized equilibrium points of the ADBC game as unique for r 1 
It is clear that the region of weight vectors r for which uniqueness can be shown is dependent on the tightness of the matrix trace inequalities. For K = 2, the inequality in (18) has been improved to the inequality in (19). Thus for the 2-user ADBC, the uniqueness can be derived for a more general set of weight vectors.
Theorem 3. For a 2-user ADBC with dirty paper coding at the transmitter and interference canceling receivers, a unique normalized equilibrium point exists for r 1 ≥ r 2 /4 > 0.
Proof: The proof follows exactly on the lines of Theorem 2 with the DSC condition decomposing into two terms given by (r 1 − r 2 4 )T 1 and r 2 4 T 2 . Now using the inequality in (19) with w = 1, it is easy to show that there exists a unique normalized equilibrium point for each point in the region r 1 ≥ r 2 /4 > 0.
E. Discussion
We have characterized the unique NoEs of the ADBC above. As the proof of uniqueness makes explicit use of the degradedness of the broadcast channel, it cannot be directly extended to the AMBC and the general GBC. Characterizing the uniqueness of the NoEs for the AMBC and the GBC and computation of these equilibria [9] is currently being investigated. In addition, we note that the uniqueness results for the linear precoding scenario are not straight forward from the DSC condition in Theorem 1.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Strategic behavior among rational non-cooperative receivers in a Gaussian broadcast channel has not been studied so far in literature. In this paper, we presented a game theoretic model for the general Gaussian broadcast channel and showed that it belongs to the special class of generalized Nash equilibrium problems with common dependent constraints. We showed the existence of the normalized equilibrium points, the solutions of the GNEP with coupled constraints, for the Gaussian broadcast channel with dirty paper coding and linear precoding strategies. In general, there exist multiple equilibrium points for a GNEP. We then derived a sufficient condition to determine the uniqueness of normalized equilibria and characterized the uniqueness of equilibria for the aligned and degraded broadcast channel.
